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UNHELPFUL AND INAPPROPRIAtE?: tHE QUEStION OF 
GENOCIDE AND tHE StOLEN GENERAtIONS
Julie Cassidy*
I Introduction
The first anniversary of the historic Australian Federal 
Government apology to the Stolen Generations on 13 
February 2008 provides a pertinent impetus to reflect again 
on this important event. One aspect that seemingly did not 
receive much attention was the interview with Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd the next day on the ABC’s Lateline program 
regarding the terms of the apology. When asked why he had 
deliberately not used the term ‘genocide’, even though that 
term had been used in the Australian Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission (‘HREOC’) report, Bringing 
Them Home, the Prime Minister’s reply was that genocide ‘has 
a specific definition in international law and I don’t believe 
[it] is either appropriate or helpful in describing the event[s] 
as they occurred or … in taking the country forward.’1 This 
article considers whether it is in fact appropriate to use the 
word ‘genocide’ when examining the historical treatment 
of Aboriginal people in Australia,2 and, in particular, the 
assimilationist policies that saw Aboriginal children forcibly 
removed from their families and detained in government 
and church institutions. 
This article begins with an introduction to the prohibition 
against genocide under international law. It then turns to 
a brief overview of the factual background of the removal 
policies that underpins the consequent analysis.  The article 
then places the question in its domestic legal context by 
examining the Australian and international jurisprudence 
thus far. It will be seen that the specific issue of whether the 
assimilationist policies relating to the Stolen Generations 
amounted to genocide has had scant attention in the domestic 
courts and has not been considered in an international 
forum. While such cases have been considered elsewhere, the 
analysis is often generic, considering the various legal issues 
in the cases3 and typically examining each case in isolation.4 
It is intended that the article will provide a useful resource 
on the application of the concept of genocide through its 
synthesis of the combined Australian litigation in the context 
of the international law jurisprudence. 
Even though, as Prime Minister Rudd suggests, the forcible 
removal of Aboriginal children from their families may not 
currently satisfy the ‘specific definition [of genocide] in 
international law’,5 the fact that so many of the elements 
of genocide are satisfied is extremely disturbing. The article 
suggests that there is a substantial, if incomplete, foundation 
for claims of genocide and this will ensure that the matter 
continues to be a burning issue for the Stolen Generations of 
Australia and for other relevant Indigenous groups, such as 
the Indian residential school survivors in Canada. 
Ultimately, it is concluded that the definition of genocide 
under international law should be revisited to include cultural 
genocide. The reasons for excluding cultural genocide are 
considered.6 It will be seen that these include legitimising 
efforts to ‘civilise’ Indigenous peoples. This rationale cannot 
be accepted. Moreover, given modern international law’s 
recognition of the right of Indigenous peoples to maintain 
their language and culture, it is arguable that modern state 
practice would no longer support such a rationale for the 
exclusion of the forced removal of Aboriginal people from 
the concept of cultural genocide. 
II A Brief Outline of Genocide at International Law
A ‘The Crime of Crimes’
International crimes include war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide and torture.7 In turn, genocide and 
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torture are considered the most serious crimes against 
humanity,8 and genocide is considered ‘the crime of crimes.’9 
This international crime has two sources under international 
law; first, international treaty law, specifically the 1948 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (‘Genocide Convention’) and the 1998 Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court (‘Rome Treaty’); and second, 
customary international law, which is derived from the 
practice of states. In a sense the two sources of international 
law are not mutually exclusive.10 Customary international 
law often predates a relevant treaty,11 while treaties often 
codify or spell out customary international law.12 This 
is evident in the international law on genocide, with the 
Genocide Convention13 and the Rome Treaty14 codifying 
customary international law’s prohibition against genocide.15 
Customary international law’s prohibition against genocide 
is binding on states, even if they have not ratified the relevant 
treaties prohibiting it.16 
As the author has elsewhere discussed in detail,17 customary 
international law, including the prohibition against 
genocide, is part of a nation’s domestic common law and is 
thus enforceable in the municipal courts. The judiciary has 
recognised that, in the absence of formal transformation 
of international law into domestic law through legislation, 
customary international law automatically flows into the 
national legal system becoming part of the ‘law of the land.’18 
In the absence of specific inconsistent national legislation, 
individuals can rely on customary international law when 
enforcing their rights in the municipal arena.19 Thus in 
Polites v Commonwealth20 Williams J noted that customary 
international law, once ‘established to the satisfaction of the 
courts, is recognised and acted upon as a part of [Australian] 
municipal law so far as it is not inconsistent with the rules 
enacted by statutes or finally declared by courts.’21 This is 
known as the incorporation or adoption theory and has been 
affirmed in a number of subsequent Australian decisions.22 
Before turning to the Genocide Convention, three interrelated 
points in regard to the character of customary international 
law’s prohibition against genocide need to be addressed. 
First, some principles of international law are jus cogens – 
non-derogable norms reflecting essential principles crucial 
to maintaining the international legal order.23 They must not 
be derogated from by international agreement (ie, treaty24) or 
national legislation, nor avoided by protest or acquiescence.25 
The prohibition against genocide is well established as a jus 
cogens norm.26 Second, interrelated with the notion of jus 
cogens are obligations erga omnes. Customary international 
rules that are erga omnes impose obligations on all states and, 
as a corollary, confer on any state the right to demand acts 
contrary to customary international law be discontinued.27 
Thus where there is a breach of an erga omnes obligation a 
third party state has locus standi to bring an action against 
the offending state.28 The prohibition against genocide under 
international customary law is recognised as imposing erga 
omnes obligations.29
Third, where an international crime is jus cogens or erga omnes 
it is also treated as delict jure gentium, extending to all members 
of the international community authority to apprehend and try 
the alleged offender.30 This universal jurisdiction to prosecute 
international crimes allows any state that has actual custody 
of the alleged offender to exercise jurisdiction over him or 
her regardless of the offender’s or victim’s nationality or the 
locus of the crimes.31 Thus, universal jurisdiction extends 
to domestic courts extraterritorial jurisdiction to prosecute 
international crimes. The doctrine of universal jurisdiction 
includes crimes against humanity and genocide.32 Universal 
jurisdiction is recognised in certain cases under customary 
international law,33 but is also supported by international 
treaty law, for example, the Genocide Convention.34 The 
doctrine of universal jurisdiction is in turn supported by 
international law’s imposition on states of an obligation aut 
dedere aut judicare35 (a duty imposed on the state in custody 
of an alleged offender to either extradite them to another 
state or prosecute).36 As noted below, treaties, such as the 
Genocide Convention, also support the co-operation of states, 
specifically in regard to extradition. 
B Genocide Convention
The Genocide Convention was ratified by Australia on 8 July 
1949. In Australia the Genocide Convention Act 1949 (Cth) gave 
parliamentary approval to the ratification, but at the time there 
was no actual domestic legislation implementing the Genocide 
Convention in Australia. Such legislation was to follow the 
Convention coming into force on 12 January 1951. However, no 
legislation specifically making genocide a crime in Australia 
was enacted until relatively recently, with the passage of the 
International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 
2002 (Cth). This Act made genocide a Commonwealth offence 
under the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). 
Article 1 of the Genocide Convention confirms that genocide is 
a crime. ‘Genocide’ is then defined in art 2:
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In the present Convention, genocide means any of the 
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.
Article 2 identifies the relevant mens rea as the ‘intent’ 
to destroy the protected group in whole or in part and is 
discussed in more detail below. Four protected groups are 
identified in art 2: national groups, ethnical groups, racial 
groups and religious groups. These terms are also discussed 
in more detail below. Specifically recognised within art 2 
is the fact that genocide may occur through the forcible 
removal of children of an identified group.
Under art 3, genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, 
direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempted 
genocide and complicity in genocide are punishable. 
Importantly in the context of this discussion, the genocide 
does not have to be effected; it suffices that there was an 
attempt to destroy a group that is identifiable in terms of 
ethnicity, race or religion. It will also be seen that, for an 
act to constitute genocide, the affected persons need not be 
numerous37 and the genocide may operate within territorial 
confines.38 Article 4 of the Genocide Convention provides 
that individuals committing genocide are to ‘be punished, 
whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public 
officials or private individuals.’
Under art 5, contracting parties such as Australia undertake 
to enact legislation giving effect to the Convention. This 
includes an obligation to provide effective penalties for 
persons committing genocide. As noted above, in Australia 
this was only recently effected through the International 
Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2002 (Cth). 
The Act inserts new provisions into the Commonwealth 
Criminal Code creating criminal offences for genocide,39 
specifically:
genocide by killing;• 40
genocide by causing serious bodily or mental harm;• 41 
genocide by deliberately inflicting on the group • 
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction;42 
imposing measures intended to prevent births;• 43 and
forcibly transferring children.• 44 
Each offence has its stated mens rea as the ‘intent to destroy’ 
and in each case the four identified groups are national, 
ethnical, racial and religious groups. The punishment 
for each offence is life imprisonment.45 Interestingly, 
this legislative recognition of the crime of genocide 
was consequent to the Rome Treaty, which created the 
International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), rather than as an 
implementation of the Genocide Convention. 
Article 6 of the Genocide Convention provides for the trial 
of persons charged with genocide by a competent tribunal 
of the state in the territory in which the act was committed 
or an international penal tribunal. In regard to the first 
aspect, and discussed further below in the context of the 
Rome Treaty, s 268.1(2) of the Criminal Code (Cth) makes 
clear Parliament’s intention that, under the Code, the ICC’s 
jurisdiction is to be complementary to the jurisdiction of 
Australian courts. The primacy of Australian jurisdiction 
over the genocide offences in the Criminal Code (Cth) is 
preserved under s 268.1(3). 
In regard to the establishment of an international penal 
tribunal pursuant to art 6 of the Convention, there was a 
considerable gap between the commencement of the Genocide 
Convention and the formation of the ICC; and in the interim 
ad hoc international tribunals were created instead. Initial 
efforts to establish a permanent international criminal court 
began in the wake of the international military tribunals 
established after World War II at Nuremberg and Tokyo, 
though these efforts were frustrated by the Cold War.46 
In the early 1990s, in response to atrocities committed 
on a massive scale in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 
the United Nations Security Council established ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals to try individuals charged 
with crimes under international law in connection with the 
civil conflicts that had occurred in each of those countries.47 
(Jurisprudence established under these tribunals is 
considered below.) Nevertheless, prior to the creation of 
the ICC, international criminal law predominantly had 
to rely on enforcement by domestic courts; and despite 
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the Genocide Convention providing for the trial of persons 
charged with genocide by an international penal tribunal, 
the municipal courts continue to have primary jurisdiction 
over genocide. Under art 9 of the Genocide Convention the 
International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’) has jurisdiction over 
disputes between contracting parties in regard to state 
responsibility for genocide.
C Rome Treaty
The ICC was created pursuant to the United Nations 
Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court held in 
Rome in July 1998, where the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court was adopted. The Rome Treaty came into 
force on 1 July 2002 upon the ratification by 60 states. As 
at June 2009, 139 states had signed the Rome Treaty and 108 
states, including Australia, were parties to it.48 Article 1 of 
the Rome Treaty establishes the ICC as a permanent court 
and vests it with jurisdiction over ‘persons for the most 
serious crimes of international concern.’ Under art 5 these 
offences include genocide and crimes against humanity.49 
The ICC can investigate and prosecute individuals50 under 
art 5 and order reparations for victims under art 75. As 
noted above, under art 9 of the Genocide Convention the ICJ 
has jurisdiction over disputes between contracting parties 
in regard to state responsibility for genocide.
As for the ICC’s jurisdictional scope, two points are relevant. 
First, some ratifying nations have expressly limited when 
they will refer a matter to the ICC. For example, on ratification 
of the Rome Treaty, Australia declared that a prosecution 
in the ICC of an Australian citizen is dependent upon 
agreement and certification by the Australian Attorney-
General.51 This procedure has been given legislative effect 
in the International Criminal Court Act 2002 (Cth). Second, the 
ICC only has complementary jurisdiction,52 meaning that it 
will take effect only when municipal courts are unwilling or 
unable to operate.53 Again, on ratification, Australia made 
the following declaration ‘the terms of which have full effect 
in Australian law, and which is not a reservation’:54
Australia notes that a case will be inadmissible before the 
International Criminal Court (the Court) where it is being 
investigated or prosecuted by a State. Australia reaffirms 
the primacy of its criminal jurisdiction in relation to crimes 
within the jurisdiction of the Court. To enable Australia to 
exercise its jurisdiction effectively, and fully adhering to its 
obligations under the Statute of the Court, no person will be 
surrendered to the Court by Australia until it has had the full 
opportunity to investigate or prosecute any alleged crimes.
III The Stolen Generations
The government policies in Australia of removing Aboriginal 
children from their families and placing them in official 
Aboriginal-only institutions is now well documented.55 
While the author has elsewhere suggested that assimilation 
was not always the sole impetus for the removal policies,56 
the logic of assimilation did form a key basis for the 
removals.57 By removing Aboriginal children from their 
families, Australian governments sought to break the 
children’s connection with their family, Aboriginal culture 
and traditional land, and in turn assimilate the children 
into white society.58 Though these policies predated 1937, 
when the first conference of the Commonwealth and State 
Aboriginal Authorities was held, a telling and now infamous 
resolution was made by Australian governments at that 
1937 conference. It was resolved that the ‘destiny of the 
natives of aboriginal origin, but not of full blood, lies in their 
ultimate absorption by the people of the Commonwealth, 
and it therefore recommends that all efforts be directed to 
that end.’59 This quote highlights two key aspects of the 
genocide debate. First, underpinning the removal policies 
during both the earlier segregation/protectionist era and 
the later assimilation period was the notion that ‘full 
blooded’ Aboriginal people would die out,60 hopefully as 
‘quickly as possible.’61 This raises the spectre of intent for 
the physical destruction of the Aboriginal races that would 
amount to genocide. Second, the aim was also to destroy, 
within Aboriginal children of mixed parentage, links with 
Aboriginal language and culture. This ties in with the 
concept of cultural genocide. Both issues are addressed 
below.  
In Australia the policies of removing Aboriginal children 
from their families predated federation. Thus, initially it 
was the State governments that promulgated the removal 
policies. For example, the Aboriginal Protection Act 1869 
(Vic) established the Board for the Protection of Aborigines, 
and under the regulations62 the Governor could order the 
removal of any Aboriginal child from their family and their 
placement in reformatory or industrial schools if the child 
was deemed neglected or unprotected. In South Australia, 
s 2 of the Aboriginal Orphan Ordinance 1844 (SA) empowered 
the Protector of Aborigines to apply to two justices to order 
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the indenture of any ‘half-caste’ or other Aboriginal child.63 
In time legislative removal powers were not premised on 
neglect, much less the requirement of a court order.64 For 
example, the neglect requirement in the Aboriginal Protection 
Act 1869 (Vic) was removed by the Aborigines Regulation 1899 
(Vic). Broader removal powers were also conferred under the 
Aboriginal Protection and Restriction of the Sale of Opium Act 
1897 (Qld). Under s 31 of the Queensland Act, the Minister 
was authorised to remove Aboriginal children from their 
families and detain them in institutions. The Queensland 
legislation stipulated that, whether the child’s parents were 
living or not, legal guardianship of all Aboriginal children was 
placed with the Chief Protector of Aborigines.65 Under these 
legislative provisions, numerous summary criminal offences 
were imposed for breaching these restrictive provisions.
Post-federation, the policies continued to be pursued by State 
governments,66 as the Commonwealth’s legislative powers 
over ‘race’ (s 51(xxvi) of the Commonwealth Constitution) 
excluded the ‘aboriginal race’. It was not until 1967, pursuant 
to a national referendum amending the Commonwealth 
Constitution, that the Federal Government obtained legislative 
powers over Aboriginal affairs. Nevertheless, through the 
Commonwealth Government’s control of the Northern 
Territory under s 122 of the Constitution and its co-ordination 
of State and Territory Aboriginal affairs, the Commonwealth 
Government played a primary role in promoting the policy 
of assimilation from the time of federation. Thus in 191167 the 
Federal Parliament enacted the Aboriginals Ordinance 1911 
(Cth), which under s 3 authorised the Northern Territory 
Chief Protector to remove any ‘aboriginal or half-caste’ child 
if it was, in the Chief Protector’s opinion, in the best interests 
of the child. Given the high proportion of Aboriginal people 
in the Northern Territory,68 the Commonwealth’s role in 
the removal of Aboriginal children was significant from the 
outset. In Cubillo v Commonwealth,69 the Full Federal Court 
found that documents dating from 191170 indicated support 
at the federal level for the removal of part-Aboriginal 
children from their families and for the placement of such 
children in institutions. 
While the primary institutions where children were 
detained in the Northern Territory were in Darwin and 
Alice Springs, sometimes part-Aboriginal boys were placed 
in an institution in Adelaide, South Australia.71 Thus, the 
children could be placed in institutions many miles from 
their families and possibly interstate. In Australia, the term 
‘Stolen Generations’72 is now commonly used to describe 
those children who were forcibly removed from their families 
under these policies.
As may be apparent from this brief discussion, in Australia 
the focus was particularly on Aboriginal children of mixed 
parentage.73 This is evidenced in a report dated 12 September 
1911 from the Acting Administrator of the Northern 
Territory to the Minister for External Affairs, in which it was 
recommended that despite the undoubted protests from 
their mothers, ‘all half-caste children who are living with 
aborigines’ should be gathered in.74 Similarly a year later the 
Chief Protector of Aboriginals reported that ‘[n]o half-caste 
children should be allowed to remain in any native camp, 
but they all should be withdrawn and placed on stations. 
So far as practicable, this plan is now being adopted.’75 
The part-Aboriginal children were identified in legislation 
using offensive terms such as ‘half-caste’, ‘quadroons’ or 
‘octoroons’, based on the perceived percentage of Aboriginal/
non-Indigenous blood; such being effectively determined on 
the child’s complexion. The concentration on part-Aboriginal 
children stemmed from the conclusion that ‘full blooded’ 
Aboriginal persons would die out.76
The legislation authorising the removal of part-Aboriginal 
children purely on the basis of race was repealed in the 1950s 
and 1960s.77 For example, the Northern Territory Aboriginal 
Ordinance 1918 (Cth) was repealed in 1957 and the Welfare 
Ordinance 1957 (Cth) did not replicate the power to remove 
part-Aboriginal children without a ‘welfare’ reason.78 In the 
Northern Territory, it was not until 1964, with the enactment 
of the Social Welfare Ordinance 1964 (NT), that Aboriginal 
children were covered by the general welfare provisions of 
that statute, rather than provisions specifically confined to 
Aboriginal children.79 Similarly, in Queensland it was not 
until the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Act 1965 (Qld) 
repealed the Aboriginals Preservation and Protection Act 1939 
(Qld) that Aboriginal children fell under the general welfare 
provisions. However, the statutory power of the Queensland 
Director of Native Affairs to remove Aboriginal children from 
Aboriginal reserves remained in force until 1971.80 Thus the 
removal of Aboriginal children occurred not only after acts of 
genocide had been prohibited under customary international 
law, but also after the Genocide Convention was drafted.
Whilst the removal of part-Aboriginal children from their 
families had been documented in Australia for many decades, 
the policy was not really debated in the public domain 
until the findings of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal 
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Deaths in Custody.81 The Commission found that, of the 
99 deaths investigated, 43 of the persons had, as children, 
been separated from their families and communities.82 It 
was not until the revelations of the HREOC report Bringing 
Them Home that the general non-Indigenous Australian 
public became truly aware of the removal policies.83 
Bringing Them Home found that ‘between one in three and 
one in ten Aboriginal children were forcibly removed from 
their families and communities between 1910 and 1970.’84 
It found that the children were forcibly taken without 
parental consent or consent obtained through threat, duress 
or undue influence. It has been estimated that in the course 
of the 1900s 40 000 Aboriginal children were removed from 
their families.85 
Bringing Them Home found that the conditions in Aboriginal 
institutions where the children were placed were poor.86 
There were often insufficient resources to properly shelter, 
clothe and feed the children.87 The standard of education 
provided in the institutions was very basic, being designed 
essentially to provide a basis for the children to ultimately 
work as menial labourers such as farm hands and domestic 
servants.88 Children were subjected to excessive physical 
punishment89 and in many cases sexual abuse.90 Significant 
for the current discussion is the fact that the children were 
not allowed to speak their Aboriginal languages and were 
punished if they did.91
It was concluded in the Bringing Them Home Report that 
the policies pertaining to the forced removal of Aboriginal 
children from their families amounted to genocide.92 The 
Report stated:
the predominant aim of Indigenous child removals was the 
absorption or assimilation of the children into the wider, 
non-Indigenous, community so that their unique cultural 
values and ethnic identities would disappear, giving way 
to models of Western culture. In other words, the objective 
was ‘the disintegration of the political and social institutions 
of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the 
economical existence’ of Indigenous peoples. Removal of 
children with this objective in mind is genocidal because 
it aims to destroy the ‘cultural unit’ which the [Genocide] 
Convention is concerned to preserve. 93
As the Bringing Them Home Report concluded, the policies 
of forcible removal of children of Indigenous Australians to 
other groups for the purpose of raising them separately from 
and ignorant of their culture and people could properly be 
labelled ‘genocidal’ in breach of binding international law 
from at least 11 December 1946.94
IV Litigation
The then Howard Federal Government responded by 
rejecting the conclusion that the removal policy amounted 
to genocide.95 Key aspects underpinning the Government’s 
rejection included:
the proportion of children affected was no more • 
that 10 per cent and such was inconsistent with the 
‘extravagance of the allegation’ of genocide;
there was no intention to destroy a group; rather the • 
motive for removing the children was a benign intent 
that reflected accepted child welfare practices at the 
time; and
the finding of genocide was inconsistent with the • 
findings in Kruger v Commonwealth96 and Cubillo v 
Commonwealth.
As suggested in the Howard Government’s response 
to Bringing Them Home, the Australian cases that have 
addressed the issue of genocide have rejected the claim that 
the forced removal of Aboriginal children from their families 
amounted to genocide. That being said, the reference by the 
Howard Government to Cubillo v Commonwealth is curious 
given genocide was not argued in that case. Furthermore, 
and as is discussed further below, Kruger v Commonwealth 
was confined to the constitutionality of a single Ordinance, 
and thus should not be seen as determining the issue.97 
Nevertheless, the approach of the courts on the issue of 
genocide and the Stolen Generations has largely been 
congruent with both the Howard Government’s position 
and now the Rudd Government’s position.
 
A Kruger v Commonwealth
The first case to raise the issue of whether the policy of 
removing Aboriginal children from their families constituted 
genocide was Kruger v Commonwealth. The plaintiffs in 
Kruger v Commonwealth were Aboriginal persons from the 
Northern Territory. Of the plaintiffs, five were removed as 
children from their families between 1925 and 1949 and 
detained as late as 1960. The sixth plaintiff was the mother of 
a child who had been removed from her family and detained 
in an Aboriginal-specific government institution. The 
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plaintiffs argued that the legislation98 and regulations that 
facilitated the removal and detention of Aboriginal children 
in the Northern Territory were constitutionally invalid on 
a number of bases.99 Most relevant for present purposes 
is the claim of unconstitutionality on the basis that the 
legislation and regulations in question authorised genocide. 
The plaintiffs sought damages for their personal, cultural, 
spiritual and financial losses, and the losses stemming from 
their consequent inability to participate in Aboriginal land 
claims. In regard to the latter, the removal of Aboriginal 
children from their communities effected a break in the 
required continuous connection with traditional Aboriginal 
lands,100 and thus prevented them bringing a land claim 
under the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 
1976 (Cth) and Native Title Act 1993 (Cth).101 
In the course of the High Court’s judgment Brennan CJ 
noted that the: 
Revelations of the ways in which the powers conferred by 
the Ordinance [facilitating the institutionalisation of part-
Aboriginal children] were exercised in many cases has 
profoundly distressed the nation.102 
Similarly, Gaudron J asserted it was ‘clearly correct’ that the 
Ordinance had ‘authorised gross violations of the rights and 
liberties of Aboriginal Australians’.103 However, ultimately 
a majority of the High Court, with Gaudron J in dissent,104 
held that the Ordinance was not invalid. 
The genocide submission was given cursory treatment by 
the Court. In terms of the sources of the relevant prohibition 
against genocide, customary international law’s prohibition 
of genocide was barely noted. The majority justices 
primarily focused on the Genocide Convention. Only Dawson 
and Toohey JJ’s judgments reflect any understanding that 
the Genocide Convention105 and the Rome Treaty106 codify 
customary international law on genocide.107 To this end 
Dawson J referred to a ‘pre-existing rule of international 
law involving a prohibition upon genocide’, acknowledging 
such to be distinct from ‘the provisions of the treaty’.108 
Toohey J recognised that the Genocide Convention ‘reflected 
a norm of international law’. 109
Beyond these simple notations, the enforceability of this 
customary international law is not addressed. This is 
particularly important in the context of the prohibition 
against genocide, as the relevant customary law predated 
the Genocide Convention. Thus customary international 
law’s prohibition against genocide was binding on nation-
states, such as Australia, even though they had not ratified 
the Genocide Convention at that point.110 This meant that 
customary international law’s prohibition of genocide had 
legal effect in the municipal arena even though the Genocide 
Convention had not been incorporated into domestic 
legislation.111 Thus the legal effect of customary international 
law’s prohibition in the domestic arena predates the signing 
of any relevant treaty, here the Genocide Convention, much 
less the date it was ratified. 
In Kruger v Commonwealth, the only aspect of the interplay 
between customary international law and the domestic 
courts that was addressed is the judicial presumption 
against a parliamentary intention to breach international 
law. A rule of construction recognised by Australian112 
and other common law courts113 is that, where possible, 
domestic legislation is to be construed to avoid conflicts 
with international norms. Of the majority justices in 
Kruger v Commonwealth, Dawson J alone noted the rule of 
construction that requires legislation to be interpreted ‘in 
accordance with established rules of international law.’114 
He concluded, however, that this is merely a
canon of construction and reading the relevant provisions 
of the 1918 Ordinance in a manner which is consistent with 
a rule of international law prohibiting genocide would 
yield no different result from reading those provisions … 
in their particular context. It certainly would not invalidate 
those provisions of the 1918 Ordinance which purportedly 
authorised the acts of which the plaintiffs complain.115
The majority justices ultimately concluded the Genocide 
Convention had been ratified after the enactment of the 1918 
Ordinance and had not been legislatively incorporated 
into domestic law.116 Relevantly, at the time of the case the 
Federal Government had not legislated to make genocide a 
domestic crime. The majority justices did not address the 
fact that the detention of Aboriginal children, including 
the plaintiffs, continued until 1960, well after Australia’s 
ratification of the Genocide Convention. There is no discussion 
of the possibility that regulations authorising the removal of 
Aboriginal children may have been made pursuant to s 67 of 
the Ordinance after this date. Nor does the majority justices’ 
conclusion address the operation of customary international 
law’s pre-existing prohibition against genocide. 
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Nevertheless, it seems the majority justices would have 
rejected the suggestion that the Ordinance breached the 
prohibition against genocide in any case. The Court held 
that the intention to commit genocide,117 as opposed to the 
actuality of effecting genocide, was important in terms of 
the validity of the legislation.118 Accordingly, there could be 
no breach of the genocide prohibition as the Ordinance was 
not intended to destroy Aboriginal peoples as a race. In the 
opinion of Gummow J, the Ordinance was indicative of a 
concern ‘to assist survival rather than destruction’.119 Most of 
the justices found that the Ordinance was said to be based on 
the best interests of the Aboriginal people.120 Thus the Court 
asserted that the view at the time121 was that it was in the best 
interests of Aboriginal children that they be removed from 
their families; and that the Ordinance could therefore not be 
seen as intending to authorise genocide.122 In regard to the 
latter point, however, it should be noted that the removal 
power under s 16 of the Ordinance was not premised on 
the best interests of the child. While under s 6 the Chief 
Protector had a discretion to remove any Aboriginal child if 
‘in his opinion it is necessary or desirable in the interests of 
the aboriginal or half-caste’, the power under s 16 was more 
absolute.123 Under s 16, the Chief Protector could cause any 
‘aboriginal or half-caste’ to be removed to, and detained in, 
any reserve or Aboriginal institution. There was no need for 
the formulation of an opinion as to what was in the Aboriginal 
person’s best interests.
Only Gaudron J appropriately addressed the plaintiffs’ 
submissions regarding customary international law. Gaudron 
J noted that the Genocide Convention embodies ‘an enduring 
peremptory norm of international law’; a jus cogens norm.124 
It was held by Gaudron J that ‘[t]he notion of genocide 
embodied in the definition in Article II of the Genocide 
Convention is … fundamentally repugnant to basic human 
rights acknowledged by the common law’.125 Furthermore, 
the Government’s legislative powers under the Australian 
Constitution ‘must be construed on the basis that they were 
not intended to confer power to make laws authorising acts 
contrary to that norm.’126 
While ordinarily 
different considerations apply to the interpretation of 
constitutional documents … s 122 [of the Australian 
Constitution, which gives the Commonwealth Parliament 
the power to pass laws for the Northern Territory] should 
be construed on the basis that it was not intended to extend 
to laws authorising gross violations of human rights and 
dignity contrary to established principles of the common 
law.127 
Thus Gaudron J concluded that the above rule of construction 
is applicable to the interpretation of the Government’s 
legislative powers, which must be construed not to authorise 
genocide. Moreover, presumably in light of its jus cogens 
status, Gaudron J held that the power to legislate for the 
Australian territories contained in s 122 Constitution ‘does not 
confer power to pass laws authorising acts of genocide.’128 
Gaudron J concluded by adding: 
Subject to a consideration of the existence of a time bar, if 
acts were committed with the intention of destroying the 
plaintiffs’ racial group, they may be the subject of an action 
for damages whether or not the Ordinance was valid.129 
Thus Gaudron J correctly acknowledged the peremptory 
nature of the prohibition against genocide and its ability to 
invalidate a contrary domestic law.  Gaudron J also correctly 
invoked the above discussed canon of construction that 
requires legislation to be interpreted in accordance with 
international law. However, her extension of this principle 
to the interpretation of the Constitution itself continues to be 
controversial.130
B Nulyarimma v Thompson
Claims of genocide were also made in Nulyarimma v 
Thompson,131 but in a different context,132 namely the 
Howard Federal Government’s ‘Ten Point Plan’133 on native 
title and consequent Native Title Amendment Act 1998 (Cth). 
While the case raises numerous legal issues in regard to the 
role of international law in the domestic arena – with some 
of the reasoning of the majority judges capable of being 
readily rejected, as the author has argued elsewhere134 – the 
case is only discussed in this article on the particular claims 
of genocide.135 
The appellants argued that the Government’s abrogation of 
Aboriginal rights pursuant to the ‘Ten Point Plan’ constituted 
acts of genocide. The appellants stressed the importance 
of traditional lands to Aboriginal people and effectively 
argued that the ‘Ten Point Plan’ was part of a continuing act 
of genocide that was designed to cause a severance between 
Aboriginal peoples and their lands. An application was 
made to the Registrar of the Australian Capital Territory 
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(‘ACT’) Magistrates Court to issue warrants for arrest of 
the then Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and two 
members of Federal Parliament on charges of genocide. The 
Registrar refused to issue the warrants, and Crispin J of the 
ACT Supreme Court rejected an application for mandamus 
against the Registrar.136 An appeal was then brought before 
the Full Court of the Federal Court. The appeal was heard 
with Buzzacott v Hill.137 As Wilcox J noted, the two cases were 
very different in their ‘nature and derivation’ but had as 
their common feature ‘claims by members of the Aboriginal 
community that certain Commonwealth Ministers and 
members of Parliament have engaged in genocide.’138 In 
Buzzacott v Hill the plaintiff instituted proceedings in the 
Federal Court against two Commonwealth Ministers (the 
then Minister for the Environment and the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs and Trade) and the Commonwealth of 
Australia, alleging that the Commonwealth’s failure to seek 
world heritage listing for the Arabunna people’s traditional 
lands constituted genocide. The defendants moved to strike 
out the proceedings and the matter was referred to the Full 
Court of the Federal Court. While the Full Court accepted 
that genocide, as embodied in the Genocide Convention, was a 
jus cogens norm and thus a crime of universal jurisdiction,139 
the claims in both the Nulyarimma and Buzzacott appeals were 
nevertheless unanimously dismissed. 
Wilcox J began by acknowledging the factual basis that 
underpins more general claims of genocide that are addressed 
below:
Anybody who considers Australian history since 1788 will 
readily perceive why some people think it appropriate to use 
the term ‘genocide’ to describe the conduct of non-indigenes 
towards the indigenous population. Many indigenous 
Peoples have been wiped out; chiefly by exotic diseases and 
the loss of their traditional lands, but also by the direct killing 
or removal of individuals, especially children. Over several 
decades, children of mixed ancestry were systematically 
removed from their families and brought up in a European 
way of life. Those Peoples who have been deprived of their 
land, but who nevertheless have managed to survive, have 
lost their traditional way of life and much of their social 
structure, language and culture. 140
In turn, Wilcox J acknowledged that it was possible to make 
a case that genocide had occurred within the terms of the 
Genocide Convention on the basis of four different categories 
of genocide:
killing members of the group; causing serious bodily harm or 
mental harm to members of the group; deliberately inflicting 
on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; and forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group.141 
Wilcox J believed, however, the requisite intent to be absent. 
While it was recognised that in some cases ‘such as the rounding 
up of the remaining Tasmanian Aboriginals in the 1830s, 
and their removal to Flinders Island’, the intent to destroy 
existed, ‘the biggest killers were diseases unintentionally 
introduced into Australia by whites and the consequences 
of denying Aboriginals access to their traditional lands.’142 
Thus the destruction of the Aboriginal peoples was said to be 
unintentional. The requisite intent was held not to have been 
made out in the context of the specific claims before the Court 
concerning the ‘Ten Point Plan’ and its effects on Aboriginal 
peoples’ access to and ownership of their traditional land.143
Even if the requisite intent could be established, Wilcox J 
ultimately rejected the claims on the basis that genocide was 
not an offence under Australian law.144 His Honour held that 
in the absence of specific legislation creating a crime, the courts 
should refuse to enforce a customary international law that 
creates such a crime.145 Whitlam J also refused to recognise 
customary international law’s prohibition against genocide, 
doing so on the basis that such was said to be contrary to 
the principle that the courts cannot create crimes.146 Against 
this, Merkel J in his judgment noted that the Court was not 
creating a crime, but rather recognising an existing crime 
under customary international law.147 
Whitlam J also held that customary international law’s 
prohibition against genocide would be inconsistent with the 
Criminal Code 1995 (Cth), which at that time did not make 
genocide a crime in Australia.148 Effectively, he reasoned 
that, since s 1.1 of the Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) abolished 
all common law offences, this would include customary 
international law’s prohibition against genocide.149 However, 
as Merkel J noted, s 1.1 refers to Commonwealth statutory 
and common law offences, not crimes under customary 
international law or the common law generally.150 Most 
significantly, Wilcox J rejected the proposition that a ‘norm 
of international law criminalising conduct that is not made 
punishable by the domestic law entitles a domestic court to 
try and punish an offender against that law’.151 Both Wilcox 
and Whitlam JJ erroneously152 required a domestic statute 
incorporating genocide into the municipal common law.153 
(2009)  13(1)  A ILR 123
In contrast, Merkel J acknowledged that, absent inconsistency 
with domestic law, customary international law is enforceable 
in domestic courts,154 and thus that the crime of genocide 
was known to Australian law. Merkel J further noted that 
receiving the crime of genocide would be consistent with 
the common law.155 His Honour concluded that ‘genocide 
is an a fortiori example of where a rule of international law 
is to be adopted as part of municipal law’156 and that ‘it is 
difficult to see why a court should turn its back on over 300 
years of acceptance of the law of nations forming a part 
of the common law.’157 Merkel J concluded that ‘genocide 
is an offence under the common law of Australia’158 and 
that ‘genocide was a universal crime under customary 
international law at the time of the events relied upon in the 
two matters before the Court.’159 
Ultimately, however, Merkel J believed customary 
international law’s prohibition against genocide was 
inconsistent with s 16 of the Parliamentary Privileges Act 1987 
(Cth). This provision prohibits a court from inquiring into 
the propriety of the exercise of legislative power or related 
parliamentary proceedings, and declared that members of 
Parliament in speaking to and voting on a Bill cannot commit 
a crime.160 Thus, the parliamentarians who formulated the 
‘Ten Point Plan’ could not be indicted for genocide.161 As to 
the specific claims made by the applicant Buzzacott, Merkel 
J held the conduct complained of was ‘plainly not capable 
of constituting genocide under international or municipal 
law’,162 and that the claims could not be sustained.163 
C Thorpe v Kennett
Subsequent cases relating to genocide in Australia have been 
given comparatively cursory consideration, largely on the 
basis that Nulyarimma v Thompson had effectively determined 
that such claims could not be made. In Thorpe v Kennett,164 this 
approach was taken by the Victorian Supreme Court. In that 
case, the Registrar of the Magistrates’ Court of Victoria had, 
on the request of the plaintiff, issued a charge and summons 
against the then Premier of Victoria, Jeffrey Kennett, for the 
universal crime of genocide. The charge was said to relate to 
numerous acts, committed with the intent to destroy the 
original peoples of the land, causing serious mental harm to 
the original peoples of the land and deliberately imposing 
upon the original peoples of the land conditions of life 
calculated to destroy each peoples in whole or in part.165 
Specifically, the plaintiff asserted that the then Premier 
had committed genocide by refusing to recognise the 
Gunai peoples as a sovereign nation and enacting the Land 
Titles Validation (Amendment) Act 1998 (Vic), which further 
diminished the native title rights of the Gunai.166 
On the basis of Crispin J’s first instance decision in the 
Nulyarimma proceedings, Re Thompson; Ex parte Nulyarimma,167 
the charges had been dismissed in the Magistrates’ Court for 
want of jurisdiction, namely that the offence of genocide does 
not form part of domestic law. The plaintiff’s appeal to the 
Chief Magistrate had in turn been dismissed, again on the 
basis of Crispin J’s decision at trial. In the Victorian Supreme 
Court, the decision of which was handed down after the 
appeal in Nulyarimma v Thompson had been decided, Warren 
J expressed reservations as to Merkel J’s approach to the 
incorporation of international customary law into the common 
law in Nulyarimma v Thompson, preferring the approach of 
Wilcox J.168 Her Honour concluded that genocide was not 
a criminal offence under the common law or the Crimes Act 
1958 (Vic),169 reiterating the view that it is necessary to enact 
specific legislation incorporating genocide into domestic law 
for that offence to be enforceable.170 Moreover, in regard to 
the specific allegations, the requisite intent to destroy was 
again said to be absent. 171
It is worth noting briefly that the judgment of Warren J puts 
an erroneous gloss on Merkel J’s approach in Nulyarimma v 
Thompson to the incorporation of customary international 
law into domestic law. Warren J asserted that, under Merkel 
J’s approach, ‘by the signing of an international treaty or 
convention the provisions of such a document are immediately 
incorporated into the law of the jurisdiction.’172 In fact, Merkel 
J’s discussion of the incorporation of international law into 
domestic law was confined to customary international law. 
His Honour was not suggesting that treaties and conventions 
(conventional international law) are self-executory.
D Sumner v United Kingdom of Great Britain
In Sumner v United Kingdom of Great Britain,173 a decision 
of the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court, 
Nulyarimma v Thompson was again said to have determined 
that genocide is not an offence under Australian law. The 
plaintiff sought an interim injunction in the South Australian 
Supreme Court to restrain the building of the Hindmarsh 
Island bridge because of concerns as to the possible desecration 
of the site and culture of the Ngarrindjeri people.174 To this 
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end the statement of claim asserted that the Ngarrindjeri 
people have a ‘special interest in the land and waters, at the 
site of the proposed bridge at Goolwa, as traditional owners 
.... and as victims of genocide since white invasion’.175 The 
plaintiff claimed that the defendants were liable for the 
theft and wrongful acquisition of Ngarrindjeri land and 
for ‘continuing acts and attempted acts of genocide against 
Ngarrindjeri by the defendants since 1800’.176 It was asserted 
that the defendants owed a duty of care to the Ngarrindjeri 
‘not to commit or attempt further acts of genocide and to 
protect Ngarrindjeri from any further acts or attempted 
acts of genocide.’177 As to the bridge, the agreements for its 
construction were said to be illegal as they were contrary to, 
inter alia, the Genocide Convention Act 1949 (Cth) and other 
human rights standards at international law.178
Bizarrely, the plaintiff relied on the Genocide Act 1969 (UK). 
Despite such legislation expressly providing that it did not 
have extraterritorial effect, the plaintiff asserted there was 
sufficient historical connection between the Ngarrindjeri 
people and the United Kingdom to allow the reliance on the 
statute.179 At first instance, Nyland J rejected the application, 
concluding that the Court did not have jurisdiction under 
the Genocide Act 1969 (UK).180 As to the issue of genocide, 
Nyland J reiterated that Nulyarimma v Thompson represented 
the current state of the law.181 
On appeal, the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme 
Court unanimously rejected the subsequent appeal, 
agreeing with Nyland J that the appellant had not made out 
that there was a serious issue to be tried.182 Specifically in 
regard to the claims of genocide, the Full Court asserted that 
Nulyarimma v Thompson had determined that genocide was 
not an offence under Australian law.183 As to the Genocide 
Act 1969 (UK), the Full Court reiterated that this was an 
Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom and had no 
application in South Australia.184
The matter came before Nyland J again as a consequence of 
applications to strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim 
on the bases that the allegations of fact did not amount to 
genocide under international law and genocide is not a crime 
under Australian domestic law.185 Nyland J acknowledged 
that genocide is a serious offence under international law 
which forms part of Australia’s treaty obligations and is 
a ‘peremptory norm of customary international law’.186 
However, His Honour stated that it was firmly entrenched 
that entering into a treaty does ‘not give rise to a direct source 
of rights and obligations under Australian domestic law.’187 
In turn Nyland J concluded that the plaintiff could not rely 
on the Genocide Convention as it had not at that time been 
incorporated into Australian law.188 
Nyland J did not, however, adequately address the role of 
customary international law. It was held that cases such 
as Chow Hung Ching v The King189 provide that customary 
international law is merely a ‘potential source of Australian 
common law but not an automatic part of it.’190 Whether 
this was in fact decided in Chow Hung Ching v The King is 
highly contestable.191 Indeed, in Nulyarimma v Thompson, 
Merkel J was of the opinion that Chow Hung Ching v The King 
in fact supports the ‘common law adoption approach’192 to 
international customary law, viz, that customary international 
law will be adopted or received into domestic law so long as 
it is ‘not inconsistent with rules enacted by statutes or finally 
declared by the [courts]’.193 Ultimately, Nyland J held, on the 
basis of Nulyarimma v Thompson and the Full Court’s decision 
in Sumner v United Kingdom of Great Britain, that the offence of 
genocide was not recognised in Australian domestic law.194 
Interestingly,  Nyland J asserted that all three justices in 
Nulyarimma v Thompson held that, in the absence of domestic 
legislation, the crime of genocide is not cognisable under 
Australian law.195 As noted above, that was not the view 
shared by Merkel J.
As to the specific claims, Nyland J turned to the Genocide 
Convention, noting that under art 2 the intention to destroy 
is an essential element of the crime of genocide.196 In turn, 
it was concluded that by building the bridge none of the 
defendants intended to destroy the Ngarrindjeri.197 Nyland 
J also rejected the plaintiff’s assertion that the failure to 
recognise the Ngarrindjeri as a sovereign nation amounted to 
an intention to destroy them.198 Moreover, Nyland J asserted 
that the argument involved questioning the acquisition of 
sovereignty in Australia. This was rejected on the basis that 
no residual sovereignty resides in Australia’s Indigenous 
peoples and that the issue is a non-justiciable act of state.199 
It is beyond the scope of this article to address the issue of 
Aboriginal sovereignty and the justiciability of the issue. 
These have been discussed by the author elsewhere.200 
Ultimately, the defendants’ orders were granted and the 
whole action was struck out.201
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V Application of the International Jurisprudence 
on Genocide to the Stolen Generations
The analysis now turns to international forums’ discussion 
of the crime of genocide and the applicability of such to the 
treatment of Aboriginal peoples of Australia generally and, 
in particular, the forced removal of Aboriginal children from 
their families. While the forced removals ultimately fall short 
of satisfying the legal definition of genocide for reasons that 
will be explained below, it will be seen that the situation 
of the Stolen Generations nevertheless meets a significant 
number of the existing legal criteria for genocide.
A Protected Group
The first matter that needs to be determined is whether the 
Aboriginal peoples of Australia are a protected group. As 
noted above, art 2 of the Genocide Convention identifies four 
protected groups: national, ethnical, racial and religious 
groups. This in itself is an important aspect of the crime 
of genocide, as it reinforces that the ‘victim of the crime of 
genocide is the group itself and not the individual.’202 This 
is because the victim is not targeted on account of his or her 
individual characteristics, but because of membership in the 
group.203 A common criterion of the four types of groups 
protected by the Genocide Convention is that ‘membership in 
such groups would seem to be normally not challengeable 
by its members, who belong to it automatically, by birth, in a 
continuous and often irremediable manner.’204 
An ‘ethnic group’ was defined in Akayesu,205 a decision of 
the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (‘ICTR’), 
as a ‘group whose members share a common language or 
culture.’206 This was reiterated in Kayishema,207 the ICTR 
adding that an ‘ethnic group’ is ‘a group which distinguishes 
itself as such (self-identification); or a group identified as such 
by others, including perpetrators of the crimes (identification 
by others).’208 
In Akayesu a ‘racial group’ was defined as a group ‘based 
on the hereditary physical traits often identified with a 
geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, 
national or religious factors.’209 Again, self-identification 
and identification by others are important defining elements 
of a racial group.210 In Akayesu211 the Tribunal also defined 
a ‘religious group’ as a group ‘whose members share the 
same religion, denomination or mode of worship.’212 To 
some extent a broader notion was adopted in Kayishema, 
where the Tribunal defined a ‘religious group’ as including 
‘denomination or mode of worship or a group sharing 
common beliefs.’213 
In the context of this article, the Indigenous peoples of 
Australia, including those affected by the assimilationist 
removal policies, could be identified as an ethnic, religious or 
racial group or groups. The above description of the necessary 
religious linkages, at least as defined in Kayishema, is clearly 
not confined to formalised Western religions, but includes 
shared beliefs and thus would readily include Aboriginal 
beliefs, such as creation stories. It is true that, contrary to the 
criteria established in relation to ethnic and religious groups, 
the Aboriginal peoples of Australia do not share a common 
language, and their cultural and religious practices and 
beliefs vary from one linguistic group to another; however, 
these peoples may still fall into these protected categories, 
as the group affected by the genocide may be confined 
by territorial limits.214 Thus in Krstic,215 a decision of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(‘ICTY’), the Trial Chamber asserted that ‘the intent to 
eradicate a group within a limited geographical area such 
as the region of a country or even a municipality’216 could 
be characterised as genocide. The genocidal massacre in that 
case had occurred in a limited geographical area, namely 
Srebrenica. In the context of the Australia’s Indigenous 
peoples, the group that may be affected by genocide could 
be a particular Aboriginal linguistic group, occupying a 
distinct area, sharing a common language and culture and/or 
religious beliefs. That affected group might be, for example, 
Tasmanian Aboriginal persons. Alternatively, identification 
could be on the basis of a racial group, as this does not 
require a shared language or culture.217 
In regards to both ethnic and racial groupings, self-
identification or alternatively identification by others, 
including the perpetrator, is important.218 In addition to 
subjective identification of membership by either the victim 
or the perpetrator, ICTR in Akayesu noted that membership 
can be determined objectively through official classifications 
of an ethnic or racial group.219 Thus in that case the Tribunal 
determined that Rwandan authorities considered Hutu and 
Tutsi as two distinct ethnic groups. Government identity 
cards, for example, detailed a person’s relevant ethnic group 
and in turn the designation of Hutu or Tutsi.220 Similarly, in 
Rutaganda221 ICTR noted a number of objective indicators 
of the Tutsi population as a distinct ethnic group in the 
Rwandan Constitution and other legislation.
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Turning to the Stolen Generations and the criterion of 
identification by others222 as a racial group, the legislation 
that empowered government authorities to remove 
Aboriginal children from their families was racially based. 
The legislation specifically related to children of Aboriginal 
descent and, in particular, children of mixed ancestry. In 
addition to the specific legislative references to ‘aboriginal 
child’,223 the offensive legislative distinction between 
‘half-castes’, ‘quadroons’ and ‘octoroons’224 could also 
constitute a form of official classification. In the context of 
the Stolen Generations, there is therefore the possibility of 
two officially classified racial groups that could distinctly 
be considered in relation to genocide claims. The first is 
Aboriginal peoples who were classified as ‘full bloods.’ As 
noted above, underpinning the segregation of Aboriginal 
peoples under so-called protectionist legislation was the 
notion that ‘full blooded’ Aboriginal people would die 
out,225 hopefully as ‘quickly as possible’.226 In the context 
of this discussion, it is the physical destruction of this racial 
group that could amount to genocide. The second racial 
group comprises Aboriginal children of mixed parentage. In 
terms of this racial group, in addition to physical destruction, 
the genocidal acts would be the destruction of Aboriginal 
language and culture; cultural genocide. These matters are 
further explored below in the context of the relevant mens 
rea and actus reas.
B Mens Rea
Did the Australian government have the requisite genocidal 
intent? Article 2 of the Genocide Convention identifies the 
mens rea as an ‘intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’227 For genocide, 
the requisite intent is dolus specialis: ‘an aggravated criminal 
intention’ which is required in addition to the intent 
accompanying the offence of, for example, murder.228 
Kriangsak Kittichaisaree asserts that ‘the requisite knowledge 
is that the accused knew or should have known that his act 
would destroy, in whole or in part, such protected group.’229 
The requirement of dolus specialis means that recklessness 
(dolus eventualis) and gross negligence are insufficient to 
satisfy genocide.230 However, if established, the genocidal 
intent does not require any further malice. Thus a misguided 
benevolent motive will not suffice to remove actions from 
the category of genocide, as long as the intent to destroy 
exists.231 This is of course relevant to the above-discussed 
suggestion that part-Aboriginal children were removed for 
the best interests of the child.
Dolus specialis is clearly difficult to establish.232 While in 
certain cases it has been readily established on the basis 
of a confession and guilty plea by the accused,233 in other 
cases the tribunals have had to infer the intent from certain 
presumptions of fact.234 To this end, it has been suggested 
that the use of derogatory language towards members of 
the group may be a factor taken into account in inferring 
the mens rea.235 The legislation that facilitated the removal of 
part-Aboriginal children in Australia used derogatory and 
offensive terms that classified children as objects depending 
on their perceived percentage of mixed parentage,236 which 
may contribute to an inference of the requisite mens rea.
Another aspect of genocide’s mens rea is the requirement of 
state involvement.237 Thus in Jelisic,238 the ICTY noted that 
in proving the genocidal intent it was necessary to show 
that the repeated killing of Muslims was backed up by a 
government organisation or system. In Kayishema239 the 
ICTR concurred with this statement in Jelisic, affirming that 
genocide requires some plan or organisation, with direct or 
indirect involvement on the part of the state. In relation to the 
Stolen Generations, the restriction of ‘full blood’ Aboriginal 
persons to reserves and the removal of children of mixed 
ancestry was part of government policies that were effected 
through legislation. Under such legislation the removals 
were formally instigated by senior government officials, 
such as the Governor,240 Minister,241 Board for the Protection 
of Aborigines,242 Department Head,243 Chief Protector of 
Aborigines,244 Director245 or Commissioner of Natives.246 
That the removals were often affected by such figures in 
conjunction with missionaries does not negate the state’s 
involvement. As Antonio Cassese notes, the relevant acts 
need not be perpetrated by State officials or by officials of 
entities such as insurgents, they are usually carried out 
with the complicity, connivance, or at least toleration or 
acquiescence of the authorities.247 
In the context of the Stolen Generations, Australian 
governments did more than acquiesce to the removals; the 
removals were part of official government policy. Further, 
once removed, the children were then often detained in 
government-designated, Aboriginal-specific institutions. 
Even though some of these institutions were run by church 
or missionary organisations, they were nevertheless officially 
classified by government as Aboriginal institutions and in 
turn received government funding.248 Based on these facts, 
the removal of Aboriginal children can be said to have been 
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effected by the state, acting either alone or in conjunction 
with religious bodies. 
Relevant to the mens rea in the case of the Stolen Generations, 
the intent merely has to be to destroy part of the group. The 
‘part’ of the group affected may be limited geographically or 
numerically. In Krstic the massacre had occurred in a limited 
geographical area, namely Srebrenica. The massacre was of 
between 7000 and 8000 Bosnian Muslim men of military age. 
These facts required the Tribunal to consider whether the 
requisite intent existed where only men of military age were 
massacred. The Trial Chamber concluded that: 
The intent to destroy a group, even if only in part, means 
seeking to destroy a distinct part of the group as opposed to 
an accumulation of isolated individuals within it. Although 
the perpetrators of genocide need not seek to destroy the 
entire group protected by the Convention, they must view 
the part of the group they wish to destroy as a distinct entity 
which must be eliminated as such.249 
As noted above, the Trial Chamber also held that ‘the intent 
to eradicate a group within a limited geographical area such 
as the region of a country or even a municipality’ could be 
characterised as genocide.250 
Thus, an intent to eradicate the Aboriginal peoples of a 
particular geographic area, such as Tasmania, would satisfy 
the mens rea requirement. The rounding up of the remaining 
Tasmanian Aboriginals in the 1830s and their removal to 
Flinders Island is noted by Wilcox J in Nulyarimma v Thompson 
as an example of an act that was ‘intended to destroy, in whole 
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’251 
As Patricia Grimshaw et al note, the original population 
of between 1000 and 10 000 Aboriginal Tasmanians at the 
point of white settlement had been reduced to 18 persons 
by 1861.252 Only the relationships between Tasmanian 
Aboriginal women and white sealers saved Indigenous 
Tasmanians from total annihilation.253 
In the broader frontier context, the intent may be described 
in terms of the intended eradication of Aboriginal persons 
not of mixed ancestry.254 As already noted, the removal 
policies in Australia were based on this notion that ‘full 
blooded’ Aboriginal persons would die out.255 As the focus 
of this article is the Stolen Generations, this is just a further 
postulation in regards to the genocidal intent in regard to 
Australia’s Indigenous peoples.256 
As for the Stolen Generations, the intent may be described 
in terms of the destruction of the language and culture of 
Aboriginal persons of mixed parentage.257 The stated intent 
underlying the policies of removing Aboriginal children from 
their families was the destruction of Aboriginal language 
and culture, so that the children could be assimilated into 
the wider non-Indigenous society.258 As the Bringing Them 
Home Report concluded, the predominant aim of the removal 
policies was ‘the disintegration of the political and social 
institutions of culture, language, national feelings, religion, 
and the economical existence’ of Aboriginal peoples.259 The 
affected group may be identified in terms of children of 
mixed parentage. As noted previously, a focus on different 
parts of a broader group does not negate a genocidal intent. 
All that is required is an intent to destroy ‘a distinct part 
of the group as opposed to an accumulation of isolated 
individuals within it.’260 The children of mixed parentage 
were treated by the Australia governments as a distinct part 
of the Aboriginal population.
It should be noted that the impact of the genocidal act does 
not have to be numerically large for the necessary genocidal 
intent to be established. During the process of drafting the 
Genocide Convention, it was suggested that the reference to 
‘intent to destroy in whole or in part … a group as such’ 
would require an intent to destroy ‘more than a small number 
of individuals who are members of the group’.261 This has, 
however, been rejected by commentators who have noted 
that nothing in the Genocide Convention could justify such a 
restrictive interpretation and that it would in fact be contrary 
to customary international law.262 According to international 
practice, ‘successful counts or prosecutions of crimes against 
humanity, of which genocide is a species, have involved 
relatively small numbers of victims.’263 Thus customary 
international law and art 2 of the Genocide Convention do not 
require the victims of genocide to be numerous. In this regard 
it is pertinent to recall the Howard Government’s claim that 
a designation of cultural genocide in relation to the Stolen 
Generations was without foundation as the proportion of 
children affected (10 percent or less) was inconsistent with 




To recap, the five prohibited acts identified in art 2 of the 
Genocide Convention are:
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(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of 
the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life 
calculated to bring about its physical destruction in 
whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within 
the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another 
group.
In regard to genocide through the imposition of serious 
bodily or mental harm, the acts that fall under this category 
are extremely broad and include ‘acts of torture, rape, sexual 
violence, or inhuman or degrading treatment.’265 Rape and 
sexual violence are considered one of the worst types of 
injuries as the victim suffers both bodily and mentally.266 
Particularly during the frontier period in Australia, colonists 
often raped Aboriginal women.267 Such rapes continued after 
the early colonial period. One of the plaintiffs in Nulyarimma 
v Thompson268 gave evidence that she was conceived as a 
consequence of her mother being raped by white men. In 
the context of the removal policies, many of the removed 
Aboriginal children were sexually abused.269 The children 
were also subjected to excessive physical punishment, 
including when they practiced their culture or spoke in their 
native tongue.270 They were subjected to degrading acts 
designed to desecrate their cultural and religious beliefs. As 
for governmental complicity in such acts, there is evidence 
that the governments knew or at least ought to have known 
of the abuse of the removed children.271
As Kittichaisaree recognises, an argument can be made 
that forced removal of children of the group to another group 
causes serious mental harm to these children as well as to 
their parents and close relatives, and that the perpetrator of 
such forced removal could also be punished under the rubric 
of the genocidal crime of ‘causing serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group’ as well.272 
The key Australian cases provide disturbing evidence of 
the psychological harm caused to members of the Stolen 
Generations through the removal from their families.273 
There is evidence that as early as the 1940s ‘the importance 
of affection in a child’s normal development and the role 
played by parental affection in behaviour disorder’ had 
been recognised.274 Thus at least in regard to removals after 
this date, Australian governments knew or ought to have 
known of the consequent risk of psychological damage to the 
removed children. In this regard it is relevant to note that in 
Cubillo v Commonwealth275 the Commonwealth conceded that 
trauma might have occurred whether or not the separation 
was voluntary but asserted that, despite the significant risk 
of pain and trauma, it was believed better to remove the 
part-Aboriginal child from its environment. In Kruger v 
Commonwealth, the High Court recognised that, 
[i]n retrospect, many would say that the risk of a child 
suffering mental harm by being kept away from its mother 
or family was too great to permit even a well-intentioned 
policy of separation to be implemented.276
As to genocide through deliberately inflicting conditions 
of life calculated to bring about physical destruction, this 
method of destruction does not immediately lead to death, 
but nevertheless ultimately leads to the physical destruction 
of the group.277 
Examples of such conditions of life include starving the 
targeted group; depriving the targeted group of proper 
housing (including systematic expulsion from homes), 
clothing, hygiene, and medical care for an extended 
period; subjecting the targeted group to a subsistence diet; 
compelling the targeted group to do excessive work or 
undergo excessive physical exertion.278 
Arguably, such would be applicable to the poor conditions 
on reserves where ‘full-blooded’ Aboriginal peoples were 
statutorily confined. Equally, it is relevant to the substandard 
conditions in the Aboriginal institutions where children of 
mixed parentage were held. The Bringing Them Home Report 
found that the conditions in the institutions where the children 
were placed were frequently appalling.279 There were often 
insufficient resources to properly shelter, clothe and feed the 
children.280 Aboriginal people removed as children have told 
of insufficient warm clothing and footwear and inadequate 
food, including maggot-infested food.281 Witnesses in the 
Cubillo v Commonwealth case spoke of always being hungry.282 
One of the plaintiffs, Mr Gunner, and another witness gave 
evidence that the children went to the rubbish dump looking 
for food.283
Again, it appears that government authorities were aware 
of the appalling conditions in which the children lived. The 
1948 Bateman Report into native affairs in Western Australia 
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noted the general problem of malnutrition and in certain 
cases unacceptable sanitation and hygiene.284 Lavatories, 
bathrooms and laundries were described as ‘not only 
primitive but in some cases disgraceful’ and the ‘bedding 
in the children’s dormitories was filthy.’285 Equally, in the 
Cubillo v Commonwealth case the Full Federal Court found 
that by 1956 the Director of Welfare and the Northern 
Territory Administrator were expressing concerns about 
the staff and management of the Aboriginal institutions in 
which the plaintiffs were detained.286 The conditions were 
regarded as being unsatisfactory even according to the 
standards of the time.287 The institutions were found to be 
inadequately staffed and the facilities were inadequate and 
unhygienic. Complaints had been made about the lack of 
food and clothes provided to the children.288 The amenities 
and staffing at one of the institutions were considered to be 
so bad that, at one stage, it was recommended that no more 
children be placed in the hostel.289 This evidences a known 
failure, at least in some cases, on the part of the governments 
to properly maintain the children and provide them with the 
necessities of life so they could live with ‘some acceptable 
level of dignity’.290
As to measures preventing births, as noted above, the so-called 
protectionist ‘legislation restricted the rights of Aboriginal 
people in many fundamental areas such as their freedom of 
movement and association, their right to marry, to work and 
to deal with property.’291 In Nulyarimma v Thompson292 one of 
the plaintiffs gave evidence as to how she was forced by the 
superintendent at the Aboriginal institution where she was 
held to marry a white man. This was part of the social theory 
that Aboriginality could be ‘bred out’ through the mixing of 
the races.293
As to genocide through the forcible transfer of children of the 
group to another group, Aboriginal children were forcibly 
removed from their families and detained in Aboriginal 
institutions. In the leading cases the plaintiffs gave evidence 
as to their traumatic physical removal from their families.294 It 
is nevertheless relevant to note that ‘forcibly’ being removed 
is not confined to physical force.295 It may include threats of 
force or coercion through fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological oppression or abuse of power. 296 The threat 
may be against the child or another person.297 Thus the 
threatening of parents (discussed in Part III above) suffices 
for the removal to be considered forcible.
VI Concluding Thoughts: Cultural Genocide
Given the express inclusion of the forcible removal of children 
as a genocidal act in art 2 of the Genocide Convention, why 
would Prime Minister Rudd suggest that the international 
law definition of genocide is not met? Traditionally, cultural 
genocide is seen as falling outside international law’s 
prohibition of genocide.298 Why then is the forcible removal 
of children included in art 2? This was intended to catch 
those cases where the ‘ultimate result of such transfer is the 
actual physical destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or 
religious group, as such.’299 Thus, the inclusion of the forcible 
removal of children as a genocidal act in art 2 recognises that 
such can constitute both physical and cultural genocide. 
Ultimately, however, to be prohibited, the cultural genocide 
must be accompanied by a physical destruction of the group. 
Storey argues that the forcible removal of children effects 
the necessary physical elimination of the protected group. 
This occurs over a period of a generation or more as it is the 
removal policy that prevents self-perpetuation through the 
elimination of the ‘features that define the group as a group, 
distinct from the broader community.’300 Thus, through the 
planned destruction of culture and language, the removal of 
part-Aboriginal children can be said to have been designed to 
prevent the continued identity of the children as Indigenous 
and therefore distinct from the broader non-Indigenous 
community. In this way, the removal of part-Aboriginal 
children can be categorised as a prohibited genocidal act.
As Kittichaisaree notes, however, conventionally the removal 
of children has been classified as cultural genocide, falling 
outside international law’s prohibition of genocide.301 This 
view was also subsequently adopted by one of the authors 
of the Bringing Them Home Report, Sir Ronald Wilson, who 
recanted from the Report’s conclusion that the removals 
did in fact amount to genocide.302 Currently there is ‘no 
judicial authority, treaty provision, or State practice to 
support’ the notion that the ‘destruction of culture short of 
physical destruction of such protected groups [constitutes] 
an act of genocide.’303 Thus in Krstic the Trial Chamber had to 
consider the extent to which it could have regard to evidence 
of the cultural or social, as opposed to physical or biological, 
destruction of the group. It stated: 
despite recent developments, customary international law 
limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the 
physical or biological destruction of all or part of the group. 
Hence, an enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological 
U N H E L P F U L  A N D  I N A P P R O P R I A T E ? : 
T H E  Q U E S T I O N  O F  G E N O C I D E  A N D  T H E  S T O L E N  G E N E R A T I O N S
Vo l  13  No 1 ,  2009130
characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these 
elements which give to that group its own identity distinct 
from the rest of the community would not fall under the 
definition of genocide. The Trial Chamber however points out 
that where there is a physical or biological destruction there 
are often simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious 
property and symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks 
which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an 
intent to physically destroy the group. In this case, the Trial 
Chamber will thus take into account as evidence of intent to 
destroy the group the deliberate destruction of mosques and 
houses belonging to members of the group.304
The inclusion of cultural genocide in the Genocide Convention 
was specifically rejected by the Sixth Committee of the 
United Nations General Assembly, on the grounds that the 
Convention relates to ‘physical destruction of a group, not 
to eliminating its cultural attributes.’305 The stated concern 
was that concept of cultural genocide was not susceptible to 
precise definition.306 Moreover, it was felt that the destruction 
of culture could be addressed in other areas of international 
law, such as human and minority rights, rather than the 
crime of genocide.307 Genocide should focus on the physical 
destruction of the group, in particular mass killings.308
However, a more insidious reason for its exclusion was also 
suggested when the Genocide Convention was being drafted. 
The inclusion of cultural genocide ‘might impede legitimate 
efforts by States to foster a national community and civilize 
“primitive” peoples.’309 As Robert van Krieken notes, this 
was hardly surprising given the United Nations ‘was broadly 
in support of the full assimilation of Indigenous peoples in 
a range of settler-colonial settings.’310 Such a rationale for 
rejecting cultural genocide is obviously based on outdated 
and offensive notions of legitimising the colonisation of 
Indigenous people on the basis of cultural superiority. In 
light of international law’s recognition of Indigenous peoples’ 
right to language and culture, reflected in international 
instruments such as the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples,311 such a rationale for excluding cultural genocide as 
a genocidal act must be rejected. The definition of genocide 
needs to be revisited to recognise cultural genocide. It may be 
that this occurs through the development or modification of 
international treaty law on genocide. Alternatively it might 
be argued that state practice is developing, or may have in 
fact already developed, to a point that cultural genocide 
effected through the removal of children from a protected 
group is recognised as a genocidal act. While it appears that 
the domestic courts in Australia are unwilling to revisit the 
genocide issue, if the jurisdiction of the ICJ or the ICC can 
be invoked in relation to the Stolen Generations, it may be 
that modern customary international law could be expanded 
to recognise the destructive impact of cultural genocide on 
Indigenous groups. 
Even if the removal of part-Aboriginal children from their 
families does not technically amount to genocide under 
international law, that does not detract from the painful 
and destructive consequences of the assimilationist policies. 
As van Krieken notes, ‘it is possible to have both a narrow, 
legally legitimate conception of genocide, but also a broader 
one that does justice to the violence at the heart of the settler-
colonial project.’312 Ultimately, contrary to Prime Minister 
Rudd’s suggestion, it is far from unhelpful to use the notion of 
genocide in the context of addressing the Stolen Generations 
issue. While the Prime Minister may be correct insofar as it 
may be technically inappropriate to use the term genocide in 
a legal context, in the broader political and social context of 
the apology he was arguably wrong not to invoke the term 
and all the human emotions that accompany its use.
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